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Non-filing of income tax takes place when 
taxpayers fail to submit a tax declaration, 
despite being liable to do so, thus becoming 
ghosts in the eyes of tax authorities. It is a 
widespread phenomenon in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). Increasing evidence has been 
produced on non-filers in Rwanda, Uganda, 
Malawi, Kenya and Nigeria. Eswatini is 
no exception: over half (57 per cent) of 
personal income tax (PIT) returns are 
missing for 2013–2018; figures for corporate 
income tax (CIT) are lower (43 per cent), but 
still alarming. 
Non-filing has important negative 
repercussions in terms of fairness and 
equity, on top of undermining domestic 
revenue mobilisation. Hence, it is crucial 
for both researchers and tax authorities to 
understand what drives this phenomenon. 
Unfortunately, non-filing remains a 
neglected topic, with most tax literature 
focusing on positive filers. Here, we focus 
on non-filing of PIT, a progressive tax on 
income generated by non-incorporated 
traders, and consider two interrelated 
questions: (i) which economic and 
behavioural factors explain the decision 
to file a return in a given year? and (ii) 
do these factors differently impact the 
persistence of non-filing over time? A 
third crucial question naturally arises: are 
the same factors explaining self-reported 
compliance? 
Our theoretical approach builds on the 
behavioural formulations of the taxpayer 
decision. We consider six sets of drivers: 
(i) economic deterrence, (ii) compliance 
costs of filing, (iii) trust in the authority and 
political legitimacy, (iv) fiscal exchange or 
the reciprocity between taxes and public 
services, (v) social norms against tax 
evasion, and (vi) intrinsic motivation to 
comply. 
Merging survey and 
administrative data
We address our research questions in a quite 
novel way. We combine a detailed in-person 
taxpayers’ perception survey of 1,007 
taxpayers – the first data collection effort of 
this type ever carried out in Eswatini – with 
rich administrative data provided by the 
Eswatini Revenue Authority (SRA). To the 
best of our knowledge, tax return data from 
Eswatini has not previously been studied. 
Also, the merging of different datasets is not 
common in the tax literature, which often 
relies only on survey-based self-reported 
measures of compliance.
With the administrative data available we 
identify two main categories: active taxpayers 
who filed returns for the 2018 tax year, 
and non-filers who failed to do so. We split 
the survey sample evenly across the two 
categories to allow comparisons. We are also 
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able to track the filing behaviour of taxpayers, 
and define perpetual active/non-filers as 
those taxpayers who consistently filed/fail 
to filed every year in the period 2013–2018. 
Past filing behaviour is another key 
dimension unduly neglected by the literature.
What drives the decision 
to file?
We find that some key factors – economic 
deterrence, compliance costs and moral 
factors, e.g. intrinsic motivation and peer 
pressure – are highly correlated with filing, 
while others are not. More specifically, 
four out of the six theoretical motivations 
statistically significantly discriminate 
between active filers and non-filers. First, 
the perception of audit risk is positively 
related to filing – taxpayers with higher 
audit risk perception were 12 per cent and 
11 per cent more likely to file last year and 
be perpetually active, respectively. Second, 
compliance costs are also important and 
account for a reduction of 16 per cent 
(15 per cent) in the probability of being 
(perpetually) active. Third, social norms 
affect compliance: adhesion to a social norm 
explains a fifth and a third of last year’s and 
perpetual filing, respectively. Lastly, having a 
high tax morale implies an increase of 21 per 
cent and 12.5 per cent in the probability of 
filing last year or persistently, respectively. In 
contrast with conventional wisdom, we find 
that neither trust nor reciprocity motivations 
covary with compliance. 
As a second set of results, we compare 
the evidence above with the results from a 
regression in which self-reported willingness 
to comply is the outcome. This is to show 
how this self-reported measure is in reality 
driven by different factors than those shaping 
actual behaviours. Our results mean that, 
while compliance costs and fiscal exchange 
correlate with actual and self-reported 
compliance in the same way, other key 
factors, such as social norms and deterrence, 
show different, if not opposite, patterns. 
Lastly, we find that lack of tax knowledge, 
a key indicator of tax compliance costs, is 
strongly correlated with filing. One extra tax 
question answered correctly is associated 
with an increase of 14 per cent and 9 per 
cent in the probability of filing last year 
and being persistently active, respectively. 
Linked to that, background characteristics 
related to compliance costs, e.g. employing 
a tax accountant and having a more mature 
business, are also correlated with filing. 
Key policy recommendations
• First, the study shows that enforcement 
is important. The SRA should continue 
stressing its role as a monitoring agency. 
Increased auditing efforts can be 
directed towards non-filers, who can be 
automatically detected on the database 
and contacted through cheap methods 
(SMSs).
• Second, the authority should focus more 
on improving taxpayers’ awareness and 
knowledge. Educational initiatives could 
be tailored to non-filers more specifically, 
given that they lack knowledge of very 
basic concepts. This shift towards a 
service-based paradigm should also affect 
the way the SRA provides information 
to taxpayers, as it seems that currently 
getting information from the authority is not 
correlated with active filing. 
• Third, another possible avenue of 
intervention would imply a major focus 
on the social norms of compliance, which 
appear to be strong in a small country such 
as Eswatini.
• Fourth, while it seems that trust, 
transparency and reciprocity motives are 
not important, the authority should not 
neglect them, and possibly find better ways 
of emphasising them in its communication 
strategy.
• Fifth, the tax administration could adapt 
its strategies to the fact that a gap exists 
between self-reported intentions and actual 
filing behaviour.
There is much exciting work to be done to 
exploit the combined potential of survey and 
administrative data to gain direct knowledge 
of the practical life of taxation in SSA, 
and eventually inform more realistic and 
successful tax policies.
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